Weaponized by Default: Commercial Satellite Constellations, Non-State Armed Groups, and the Accountability Gap in African Conflict Zones

Institutionally, commercial low-Earth-orbit satellite constellations are designed and licensed as civilian broadband infrastructure. This has now become documented components of active nonstate armed conflict in Africa. The research used case-study methodology, with thematic analysis of international humanitarian law‟s dual-use object doctrine, the law of state responsibility and the emerging military-space-law literature (the Woomera Manual and the MILAMOS Project). The article also used two empirical case studies: the Rapid Support Force‟ documented use of Starlink terminals for command, drone control and artillery correction in Sudan‟s civil war, and the diversion of Starlink terminals to jihadist, separatist and criminal networks across the Sahel. It was observed from the article that existing frameworks were not built for this scenario. International humanitarian law‟s dual-use object doctrine and direct-participation-in-hostilities‟ rules were designed to govern belligerents‟ own targeting decisions. The design was not for a commercial operator‟s passive, large-scale, difficult-to-monitor provision of connectivity that a non-state actor then weaponizes independently. The law of state responsibility, including Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty, does not reach the conduct of a private operator acting on its own commercial initiative rather than under state direction or control. Corporate due-diligence frameworks such as the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights impose only a responsibility to respect, not a binding legal obligation. The existing African telecommunications licensing regimes were not designed with conflict end-use screening in mind. The authors therefore recommends a layered response combining operator-level conflict-zone due diligence and geofencing protocols, binding end-user verification conditions attached to African satellite-service licences. The authors also recommended coordinated African engagements with the emerging military-space-law manuals and UN sanctions-monitoring processes to close the identified gap before instead of after, the technology‟s next diversion has already occurred.

Keywords: space law; international humanitarian law; dual-use technology; Starlink; non-state armed groups; Sudan; Sahel; corporate accountability; Africa